NEWS
X41 D-Sec GmbH Security Advisory: X41-2018-007
Multiple Vulnerabilities in mgetty
Overview
Confirmed Affected Versions: 1.2.0
Patched Versions: 1.2.1
Vendor: mgetty
Vendor URL: http://mgetty.greenie.net
Credit: X41 D-Sec GmbH, Eric Sesterhenn
Status: Public
Advisory-URL: https://www.x41-dsec.de/lab/advisories/x41-2018-007-mgetty
Summary and Impact
Multiple issues have been identified in the mgetty fax software. These might be used by local users to elevate their privileges.
X41 did not perform a full test or audit of the software.
Product Description
From the vendor: For those of you that do not know mgetty+sendfax yet: it’s a reliable and proven fax send and receive solution for unix and Linux. But it can do much more… so read the docs and be surprised.
Shell injection via faxq-helper
Severity Rating: Medium
Vector: Fax Job
CVE: CVE-2018-16741
CWE: 78
CVSS Score: 6.1
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
In fax/faxq-helper.c function do_activate(), not all characters are properly sanitized to prevent command injection. It is possible to use |
, && or > to change the control flow. |
/* replace all quote characters, backslash and ';' by '_' */
for( q = buf; *q != '\0'; q++ )
{
if ( *q == '\'' || *q == '"' || *q == '`' ||
*q == '\\' || *q == ';' )
{ *q = '_'; }
} A job file containing malicious input can be constructed using faxq-helper activate <jobid>. One faxrunq is started, the code is executed as the user running the command.
/* replace all quote characters, backslash and ';' by '_' */
# " ' ` \ $ ;
command=`tr -d '\042\047\140\134\044\073' <JOB | \
$AWK 'BEGIN { phone="-"; flags=""; pages="" }
$1=="phone" { phone=$2 }
$1=="header" { flags=flags" -h "$2 }
$1=="poll" { flags=flags" -p" }
$1=="normal_res" { flags=flags" -n" }
$1=="acct_handle" { flags=flags" -A \""substr($0,13)"\"" }
$1=="pages" { for( i=2; i<=NF; i++) pages=pages$i" " }
END { printf "'"$FAX_SENDER"' -v%s %s %s", \
flags, phone, pages }' -`
#
# execute faxsend command
#
$echo "$command"
eval $command Stack Based Buffer Overflow With Long Username in contrib/next-login/login.c
Severity Rating: Low
Vector: Command Line Parameter
CVE: CVE-2018-16743
CWE: 121
CVSS Score: 2.9
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
In file contrib/next-login/login.c the command line parameter username is passed unsanitized to strcpy(), which causes a stack based buffer overflow if too long.
char tbuf[MAXPATHLEN + 2], tname[sizeof(_PATH_TTY) + 10];
...
if (*argv) {
username = *argv;
ask = 0;
...
if (failures && strcmp(tbuf, username)) {
if (failures > (pwd ? 0 : 1))
badlogin(tbuf);
failures = 0;
}
(void)strcpy(tbuf, username); Stack Based Buffer Overflow With Long Argument in contrib/scrts.c
Severity Rating: Low
Vector: Command Line Parameter
CVE: CVE-2018-16742
CWE: 121
CVSS Score: 2.9
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
In file contrib/scrts.c a stack buffer overflow can be triggered via command line parameter.
int main( int argc, char ** argv )
{
int i, fd;
struct termios tio;
char device[1000];
for ( i=1; i<argc; i++ )
{
if ( strchr( argv[i], '/' ) == NULL )
sprintf( device, "/dev/%s", argv[i] );
else
strcpy( device, argv[i] );Stack Based Buffer Overflow and Command injection in faxrec.c
Severity Rating: Low
Vector: Command Line Parameter
CVE: CVE-2018-16744 (for command injection), CVE-2018-16745 (for overflow)
CWE: 121
CVSS Score: 2.9
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
In file faxrec.c function fax_notify_mail(), the mail_to parameter is not sanitized. It could allow for command injection or a buffer overflow if it is too long. If is called from facrec() which in turn is called from main() in mgetty.c. Since the notify_mail parameter is a configuration parameter, it should only be possible to set it from trusted source. If mgetty would be used with e.g. a webfront end, this might be abused for a privilege escalation.
void fax_notify_mail _P3( (pagenum, ppagenum, mail_to),
int pagenum, int ppagenum, char * mail_to )
{
FILE * pipe_fp;
char * file_name, * p;
char buf[256];
int r;
time_t ti;
lprintf( L_NOISE, "fax_notify_mail: sending mail to: %s", mail_to );
sprintf( buf, "%s %s >/dev/null 2>&1", MAILER, mail_to );
pipe_fp = popen( buf, "w" );Endless loop in g3/g32pbm.c
When converting g32 files using g3/g32pbm.c, an endless loop can be triggered by malformed input file. Example can be found at https://github.com/x41sec/advisories/blob/master/X41-2018-007/files/g32pmb_infinite_loop.
Out Of Bounds Access in g3/pbm2g3.c
When converting pbm files using g3/pbm2g3.c, out of bounds accesses can occur with malformed input files in putwhitespan(). An example can be found with https://github.com/x41sec/advisories/blob/master/X41-2018-007/files/pbm2g2_oob_access.
putcode( t_white[l].bit_code, t_white[l].bit_length );Workaround
None.
Timeline
2018-06-07 Issues found
2018-08-27 Issue reported to vendor
2018-08-28 Vendor reply
2018-09-08 Vendors sends patches
2018-09-08 CVE IDs requested
2018-09-09 CVE IDs assigned
2018-09-11 Patched Version released
2018-09-11 Advisory released
About X41 D-SEC GmbH
X41 is an expert provider for application security services.
Having extensive industry experience and expertise in the area of information
security, a strong core security team of world class security experts enables
X41 to perform premium security services.
Fields of expertise in the area of application security are security centered
code reviews, binary reverse engineering and vulnerability discovery.
Custom research and a IT security consulting and support services are core
competencies of X41.